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організаціям, що розробляють нормативно-методичну та
інформаційну базу забезпечення проектів енергозбере-
ження на різних рівнях управління; підприємствам-вироб-
никам енергоефективного обладнання; споживачам, які
розробили і впроваджують енергоефективні заходи та
реалізують енергоефективні проекти; підприємствам, що
зайняті оснащенням виробництва приладами обліку і кон-
тролю витрат. 
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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE OPTIMAL 
UNDERWRITING CONTRACT CHOICE 
BY THE ISSUER DEVELOPING 
Abstract. In light of the research objective, this paper analyzes the dynamics and the structure of the executed contracts under
the underwriting conduction in Ukraine in 2008-2012, as well as it determines the estimation intervals of banks’ efficiency as the
investment services providers (according to the dynamics of the issuers’ share prices during the «period of silence»).
The major result of this research is separation of the «efficient IBS market» and determination at which of the underwriting mo-
dels (based on the «firm commitment» of the bank – model «FC», or «maximum/best efforts» of the bank – model «BE») as one
of the leading investment services the offering efficiency is higher, and therefore it is more suitable for using by issuers for the
domestic or foreign stock markets entering.The analysis was conducted by using the elements of the matrix theory of games.
The authors draw conclusions on selection of the priority underwriting model, as well as the time of application by the bank
maximum market-maker’s (marketing) efforts to promote market-placed securities.
Keywords: underwriting; «firm commitment» model; «best efforts» model; investment banking services market; issuer of securi-
ties; contract.
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ПОБУДОВА КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНОЇ МОДЕЛІ ВИБОРУ ЕМІТЕНТОМ ОПТИМАЛЬНОГО КОНТРАКТУ АНДЕРРАЙТИНГУ 
Анотація. У статті проведено порівняльний аналіз ринку інвестиційних банківських послуг (на прикладі послуг андеррай-
тингу). Визначено, яка із моделей андеррайтингу – на основі «твердих зобов’язань банку» («firm commitment – FC)» чи
«максимальних/найкращих зусиль банку» (best efforts – BE)» – забезпечує вищу ефективність розміщення акцій і,
відповідно, більше пристосована для використання українськими емітентами при виході на вітчизняні або зарубіжні фон-
дові майданчики. На основі теорії матричних ігор сформульовано алгоритм маркетингового дослідження ринку, за ре-
зультатами якого керівництво банку може прийняти обґрунтоване рішення щодо пріоритетності для емітента цінних па-
перів оптимального контракту андеррайтингу.
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Introduction. Looking for the cheapest and most conve-
nient sources of the large projects financing by the major
domestic companies leads to a gradual increase in demand for
investment banking services (IBS), including the services of
banks as underwriters. Therefore, the issue of conclusion a
contract between the issuer of securities and a bank, which
would maximize the benefits of both sides from operations with-
in the initial public offering (IPO), is extremely important and
requires detailed academic research.
Brief Literature Review. The problem of the contractual
relationship between the investment bank and the issuer during
the shares placement on the stock exchange at various times
was been the subject of research of many experts, among
which we can highlight the works: Baron (1979) [1], Baron and
Holmstrom (1980) [2], Ibbotson (1975) [3], Mandelker & Raviv
(1977) [4]. The findings of these authors, in turn, were based on
the scientific results of the theory of agency highlighted in the
works of authors: Green (1973) [5], Myerson (1979) [6], Harris
(1979) [7] and others.
Most of these works contain a description of general and /
or empirical studies of the specific demand generation by
agents for certain groups of economic goods, including under-
writing services under the company placement on the stock
market. Thus, D. Baron (1979) [1] describes the characteristics
of the optimal contract for banking services in advising and dist-
ribution of shares, building a model on the factors that have an
impact before the date of the initial listing of the shares on the
stock exchange. In our opinion, it would be appropriate to ana-
lyze agents market behavior after the date of first listing.
Thus, the key purpose of the study in this paper is the
separation of the «efficient IBS market» and determine at which
of the underwriting models (based on the «firm commit-
ment» of the bank – model «FC», or «maximum/best ef-
forts» of the bank – model «BE») the offering efficiency
is higher and therefore it is more suitable for using by is-
suers for entering the domestic or foreign stock markets.
Results. The last phase of the IPO – current liabili-
ties for exchange listing and increase in the capitaliza-
tion of the issuer (Ernst & Young, 2013) [8], – requires
from the investment bank (global syndicate manager
etc.) and its partners application not less effort than
before the time of offering the customer’s shares on the
stock. Accordingly, the conclusion of the optimal under
writing contract is extremely important given the need to
ensure:
1) for the bank – keeping the value of shares within
a certain price range (usually this case is achieved by
using of two instruments – the establishment of a mora-
torium on the shares sale over a certain period by the
majority shareholders and acquisition of the «over allot-
ments» option by the investment bank);
2) for the issuer – maximizing the value of the issued
shares (its certain growth rate over a certain period);
3) for regulator of the investment banking services
market (IBS market) – maintaining a stable market con-
juncture over a certain period.
The last problem can be solved, among other measures, by
providing the regulator’s oversight for the completeness and
quality of contracts’ performance in accordance to the financial
institutions’ liabilities of the underwriting conduction. For exam-
ple, in Ukraine the quarter-average value of contracts under the
underwriting conduction (on the domestic stock markets)
declined during 2008-2010, but in 2011 it was UAH 2186.85 mil-
lion (USD/UAH=8.23), which is almost three times more than
the similar indicator of 2010 (Figure 1). In the fourth quarter of
2012 this value reached a peak to UAH 6432.27 million.
Having the ability to track the dynamic implementation of
underwriting contracts in terms of quantity/volume, on the one
hand, and signed/executed agreements – on the other hand,
we construct Table 1. Analysis of this table shows a significant
increase in the average market value of the executed contracts
under the underwriting conduction in Ukraine: in the first quar-
ter of 2011 it amounted to UAH 0.83 million. In the fourth quar-
ter of 2012 it was UAH 7.47 million. However, it was observed
the minimum amount of the completed contract under the
underwriting conduction (for about UAH 500 thousand) in the
third quarter of 2011.
For the purpose of analysis it was used the amount of data
on the dynamics of the value of shares placed by Ukrainian
issuers abroad during the IPO, since the receipt of the first quo-
tation on the stock exchange.
First, we held the normalization (reduction to comparable
values) of the market data by counting a stock price growth rel-
ative to a base – the stock price on the first day of exchange
trading. The data are grouped according to two models of
underwriting (including 12 IPOs, which could be clearly identi-
fied by the information on the applicable model contract bet-
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Fig. 1: Total amount of completed contracts under the underwriting conduction in
Ukraine in 2008-2012 (for the quarter), UAH million
Source: Materials provided by the National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) [8]
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ween the bank and the issuer) while finding the average mar-
ket value for each of them. The results of the calculations are
presented in Table 2.
Each reference date, at which the stock price was mo-
nitored, meets the conditions established in the context of gen-
erally accepted international practice of the IPO management.
Thus, the «silence period» should be considered as the
length of time that usually begins within 30 calendar days prior
to the placement of securities and ending 40 days after the
shares allocation on the stock exchange. Under U.S. law, the
time frame of this period is a date of filing the registration
statement by the issuer to the American Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the time of its completion is a
date the Commission recognizes the legitimacy of this pro-
posal (effective), but not before 40 days after the start of tra-
ding on the exchange. During the silence period it is not
permitted to disclose information that might encourage
investors to buy shares, or if this information is untrue (espe-
cially it is not in the investment memorandum – «prospec-
tus»). This information should be classified as statements
regarding: new agreements signed by the company in the
quarter during which securities are placed, changes in man-
agement, threats to the strategic objectives of the company,
changes in the line of products, offers to take part in a busi-
ness partnership and other.
The curves reflecting the price
changes for shares placed by the
issuers (average values for groups
formed by the criterion of underwriting
model specified in the contract
between the bank and the issuer)
during the analyzed time period are
demonstrated in Figure 2.
As we can see from the Figure 2,
the segment (submarket) of IBS mar-
ket, determined by the criterion of
using the «BE» contract model, show-
ing relatively better than the segment
of the «FC» contract model. However,
even stocks, placed within the first
submarket, on the 365th day after the
date of initial offering have relevant
quotations on average lower than 100.0% of the nominal value
specified in the prospectus.
The indicated trend in general may indicate unwillingness of
the bank as an organizer for placing into the «firm commitment»
agreement (FC) to make the same amount (same quality) of
distribution efforts, as into the «best-effort» contract (BE). This
behavior may be due to fears of inflated value of securities to be
purchased in case of failure of the market investors from the
proposed shares (fully or partially).
The first point among the mentioned above motivations for
the underwriting contract optimizing concerns the saving of
the placed shares’ cost after the «period of silence» within a
certain range (the growth rates of the share prices are taken
for comparison). The common practice of the investment
banking sets the optimal growth rate of the share prices in a
range 5.0-15.0%. Rising above this range indicates an under
pricing of shares by the bank, and fall to the negative level
indicates their overpricing.
On the basis of the accumulated data on the majority of the
IPO, held by domestic issuers (in recent years), we’ll conduct a
comparative analysis of their stock price dynamics according to
Tables 2-3.
The analysis of the share value at the 40-th day of their
presence in the stock exchange listing indicates that the target
range (5,0-15,0% growth rate) was achieved for share prices
Tab. 1: Analysis of the structure of completed contracts under the underwriting 
conduction in Ukraine in 2011-2012 (for the quarter)
Source: Materials provided by the National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) [8]
Tab. 2: Normalization, grouping and finding the average market value for the price data in respect of shares 
placed by domestic companies during the IPO
Source: Calculated by the author based on the statistics for data exchange based on reporting companies
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from such IPO (5 out of 20 analyzed): «Agroton PLC», «Bank
Forum JSC», «KSG Agro S.A.» and «TMM Real Estate
Development PLC». Lead managers (investment advisers) of
these issues were, respectively, «Phoenix Capital Limited»,
«The Bank of New York», «Dom Maklerski BZWBK S.A.»,
«Morgan Stanley» (together with «UBS Investment Bank») and
«Concorde Capital».
Generally the next assessment inter-
vals can be identified:
1. (-oo; 5) – over pricing of shares
(measures used by investment banks for
share promotion are ineffective) – for 10
placements;
2. [5, 15] – an optimal estimate of
shares (measures used by investment
banks for share promotion are effective) –
for 5 placements;
3. (15; +oo) – under pricing of shares
(measures used by investment banks for
share promotion are ineffective) – for 5
placements.
For further analysis we use some ele-
ments of the theory of matrix games. For
this reason, the company-issuer is denot-
ed as a «Player A», and at the same time the market (the group
of investors) is denoted as a «Player B». Thus, rounding values
to integers, we consider a specific matrix with a dimensionality
2x7 and the following parameters:
Since the lower and upper price of the game are equal to
each other with a value of 99, then this game has a saddle
point, and therefore should be chosen a pure strategy (A1, B7).
These strategies are optimal in the sense that in a case of the
frequent game repetition rejection of the strategy, chosen by any
player, reduces his chances of winning (increases his chances
of losing). This statement should be explained in detail.
Initially, we’ll analyze the game on the presence of a saddle
point. For this reason, we consider the actions of a Player A .
In each row of the matrix A there is a minimal element, which in
this case is:
Among the numbers    we choose the maximum one:
In our case          , and thus                        is the
lowest price of the game. The principle of construction of a
Player’s A strategy is based on maximizing the minimum bend-
ing (win) of the game and called the max and min principle, and
appropriate strategy Ai
* is a max and min strategy for Player A.
Actions of a Player B. Each row of the matrix A includes a
maximal element:
We have     
. Among the numbers            we choose the minimum
one:               or, equivalently,                    . The number    is
the upper price of the game, the principle of construction of a
Player’s B strategy is a min and max principle and strategy Bk
*
is a min and max strategy.
Obviously, inequality          is always satisfied. In our case
the situation is equilibrium:
Strategies Ai
* and Bk
* are corresponding a saddle point are
optimal, and the value           is the game price. The economic
interpretation of the results of matrix game can be summarized
as follows:
1) at other things being equal issuers will tend to choose the
«best efforts» contract with probability (99/(99+65))*100%,
and the «firm commitment» contract with probability
(65/(99+65))*100%;
2) at other things being equal the long-term (strategic)
investors will tend to choose the time of entry into the market no
earlier than 365 days after the date of initial placement.
In this situation, the bank is the third (outside) party, but it
has an impact on the market due to the application of the
appropriate amount of efforts on the one hand, and choosing a
model of cooperation with the issuer on the other.
Conclusion. Thus, a bank conducting marketing research-
es of the domestic IBS market by using the model described
above, has the ability to: select priority model of the underwrit-
ing contract (in this case bank choose application of the «best
efforts»), to determine the time of application of the maximum
market-maker efforts for promotion of the placed securities on a
market (in this case it is not earlier than one year from the start
of exchange trading by the relevant tool).
However, a situation where     =     , which is the lower price
of the game, is equal to the upper price of the game, does not
occur often. This fact serves as a basis for a further research in
this direction.
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Fig. 2: The price changes for shares placed by the issuers 
during the one year from the date of first listing
Source: Calculated by the author based on data exchange statistics
Tab. 3: The average market value for the price data during 
the «period of silence» for certain domestic IPO
Source: Calculated by the author based on data exchange statistics
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